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should be refused what types of aid?
by Dudley Seers
The defiant gesture of the US Senate in drastically amending
the Administration's aid bill, because (inter elia) some liberal
Senators had become disillusioned at the persistence of aid to
military dictatorships, has given new point to the question posed
in the title. All agencies, bilateral and multilateral, have
been spurred to think again.
1. Development and the Moral Choices It Implies
Elsewhere2 I have argued that development is a moral
concept, and that the reduction of poverty involves the reduction
of unemployment and inequality. The well-worn equation of develop-
ment with economic growth has not stood up to the test of the
experience of the 1960's when, especially in Latin America,
high growth rates have frequently been accompanied by increasing
inequality and unemployment3: the onus of proof is surely now on
those who use growth as a proxy for development to show how it
would appreciably reduce poverty.
1 These ideas were first mooted at a meeting of the New York
Chapter of. SID. in early 1971. I have gained a great deal from
coninents of colleagues on a draft, in particular from Bernard
Schaf fer.
2 "The Meaning of Development", International Development Review,
Vol. 11, No.4, 1969. (A later version, entitled "What are we
trying to measure?" will shortly appear in the Journal of Develop-
ment Studies). This present article is an attempt to draw the
aid policy implications of that paper and other recent work.
3 See "Towards Full Employment", the report of the inter-agency
mission to Colombia, ILO, Geneva, 1970; also a note on income
distribution and unemployment in the Bulletin of the Institute
of Development Studies3 July 1970, Vol. 2, No.4. When t use
the words "concentration" or 'inequality" I am thinking primarily
of the size distribution of personal income, but there are of
course other dimensions - profits/employment incomes; salaries/
wages; urban/rural incomes. These are closely related to the
size distribution; some of them are more relevant than the
latter for the discussion of certain issues.
For my part, t believe that aid should be distributed
with the aim of reinforcing a coordinated attack on poverty,
inequality and unemployment.
2. The Recipient Government
These aims imply the need to judge the effects of the
policies of particular governments. The blunt reality - though
this is very difficult for international civil servants to accept
because it can hardly be reconciled with their organisational
rules - is that many governments are themselves the chief
obstacles to development, as I have defined it. Some are clearly
in office precisely to preserve existing inequalities; others
may well wish to eliminate poverty but }ack the political support
or the administrative capacity to do so
. To the charge that
examining the recipient's policy constitutes 'political bias' or
'interference', the answer is that all aid constitutes inter-
ference.
It is by no means easy to decide whether any particular
regime obstructs development. Two people who both knew a country
quite well, and shared a cotm1on political philosophy, and thus
the same criteria for development, might well come to different
conclusions on what will be the ultimate consequences of - say -
the policies of the military regime in Brazil.
Whether a regime is 'democratic' is certainly not the only
issue, as is sometimes pretended - often by those with other
reasons for helping or not helping a particular government. Apart
altogether from the ambiguities surrounding the word 'democracy',
the question may not even be relevant. A regime which opposes
development may have more or less genuine popular, even electoral,
support (people do not lightly give up the status quoi and can
even be induced to like it). On the other hand, as in Peru for
example, military regimes may be the agents of what most obser-
vers would call development.2
Despite these difficulties, some criteria can be established
to guide aid policy to the stated objectives. One key question
(though not the only one) is whether the government draws its
basic support from the rich or from the poor. We can get clues
here from the style of governing. Does it in fact welcome local
1 It follows from this that statistics which add together the
aid to different sorts of governments (and global aid targets,
such as the 1 per cent target) do not have much meaning.
2 In any case, as argued in "The Meaning of Development" (op.
so long as people are starving, parliamentary democracy
can hardly be a priority objective (though it may be important 7
as a means of change).
participation in the political process, or rely on patronage
and repression to contain forces working for social change? Do
those of some race or tribe enjoy special privileges, such as
a majority of key positions? Still more illuminating are
questions which reveal what choices have been made: is foreign
exchange being used to buy perfumes, motor cars and whisky, or
fertilisers (for poor peasants) and dried milk for children?
Will the factories which are being set up produce cola or
pharmaceuticals? Are more public funds being spent on motorways
or rural housing?
None of these questions is sufficient in itself. But the
answers to them help to build up a picture which identifies the
regime. If a government 'fails' most such tests, one must treat
very cautiously any claims that to help it encourages development.
3. The Effects of Financial Aid
But this does not mean we should immediately decide that
such a government ought to be denied all aid. If we applied these
tests strictly, very few governments would appear aidworthy! What
it does suggest is that we need to look carefully at the effects
of aiding it. In the Colombia report (op.cit.) we looked at the
effects of aid on development (which is defined there as implying
a reduction in unemployment). Here I shall discuss the effects of
different types of aid to 'bad' governments.
We need a framework for analysing these effects,1 and I
suggest that a doulrle distinction between economic and political
effects in both the short and the long term, provides a fruitful
approach.
One short term political effect is the 'announcement effect'.
I define this as the political consequence of the knowledge that
a government is being aided by a foreign government.2 A political
party or junta can use access to aid to justify reaching or
keeping political power
- though in an era of rising nationalism,
this effect may be diminishing (especially if the aid comes from
a 'big' country). When such an announcement strengthens a
1 I will not deal here with the various forms of military aid,
which range from direct or indirect intervention (via mercenaries
or another coufly5 armed forces) to equipment and military advice.
Naturally the -results, whether in shortrun human costs or in
developmental effects (by increasing the political power of the
military) can be very great
- those supplying such aid take on the
moral responsibility for all its consequences, including any ways
in which the equipment concerned is actually used, externally or
internally.
2 There is also of course the negative "announcement effect" of
a statement that aid is being cut off.
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repressive and unreprese.ntative government, the risk is increased
of investment patterns being distorted by corruption.
Developmental criteria for aid imply the need to weigh the
political cost of the announcement effect and of the short-term
impact on employment, while the loan is being spent, against
longer-term economic and (possibly political) benefits. Conven-
tional cost-benefit analysis is clearly not of much help to us1
since it leaves out the most important costs. Nor is an emotional
reaction against the government concerned very helpful either.
The interactions are complex. Will the reduction of unemployment
and poverty, due to aid, reduce or increase political opposition?
This echoes an older controversy (an argument which reappears
from time to time in the form of a debate over the effectiveness
of sanctions): does reducing misery make revolutions more or less
likely?2
The answer is by no means obvious. Regimes like those of
Stroessner, Salazar and Duvalier have survived quite safely
despite a spectacular lack of development. Conversely, periods
of economic progress require institutional change and can lead
to the emergence of more developmental governments. People
struggling for survival lack the energy or even interest required
for sustained militancy, let alone revolutionary action, especial-
ly if machinery for suppressing it is effective. Those who argue
that aid impedes the development of a country by inhibiting
revolution take on in any case a fearful responsibility - even
more fearful if they aptly this to all countries. They are
laying down that it is desirable for people to suffer indefinitely
and to undergo the horrors of an eventual revolution, often
without even enquiring whether the preconditions for this
exist (including the existence of a substantial and experienced
revolutionary organisation).
In my view, one must allow for the possibility that long-term
benefits will accrue to a 'better' government. The balance
between the short and long term economic effects of aid depends
on the phasing of its economic consequences over time. This in
turn depends very much on the technique of the act of
1 It even distorts this comparison by discounting the long-term
benefits, which may be the only positive ones.
2 In this debate there is an enormous amount of special pleading.
Both economists and Marxists tend to assume, almost without
question, that economic progress strengthens the political system
in which it occurs. They find it easy to believe that aiding
regimes they dislike (or alternatively imposing sanctions against
them) will be effective.
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investment.1 The choice of technique is a decision on who
is to receive the consequent income (at least in the first
round of the multiplier process); if installation costs are
relatively low, the bulk of the short-term income and
employment benefits will accrue to the citizens of the donor
country. This is especially likely to happen if, as is
usually the case, aid cannot be used to cover local costs.
In the not-so-longer term, the supply of imported equipment
like tractors or automatic plant may well displace labour in
the receiving country. It is true that it may also mean a
faster increase in output, but if this implies a rising
bill for imported spare parts, fuel, etc., and if the
increased local income benefits mostly large land owners
(who find it easy to raise credit), its development effect
may be limited.
The phasing - and therefore the net effect on develop-
ment - depends finally on the sector concerned. I can only
briefly note here some relevant points. The economic
benefits of education - especially of primary education, of
course - are mainly long-term. Moreover, education can
gradually awaken political consciousness (this depends
naturally on what is taught) and may indeed be a necessary
condition for eventual constructive change. By easing
shortages of high level manpower, it can also in tire help
achieve a less concentrated distribution of income.
Agricultural projects, especially river valley
development schemes, also have mainly long term effects
because of the time these take to mature. Such effects may
well be considerable. They include not only the obvious
increases in the output of food or exportable commodities,
but also the economic and political consequences of re-
dressing the rural-urban imbalance (which can also result
from educatioal and other projects in rural areas or
small towns). This is probably a positive effect - for
one thing it will lessen the pressure of migration on the
cities (another benefit whith is omitted from conventional
methods of project evaluation).
1 It also depen&s on the term of aid, Thus grace period
benefit the existing government, whereas the rate of
interest will principally affect future governments.
2 Though the expansion of secondary and higher education
may temporarily, at least, aggravate inequalities, because
the rich usually enjoy overwhelming advantages of access
to them.
3 Provided the benefits of such projects do not accrue
mainly to large landlords.
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Industrial projects, on the other hand, show long-term
effects (in the sense used here) fairly soon. These may be
helpful to employment by saving (or earning) foreign exchange.
On the other hand, major new, highly mechanised, factories,
especially in textiles, may at an early date bankrupt tho9ands
of artisans, or at least inhibit the growth of employment.
This short outline of possible effects reflects partly
our limited ability - in the present state of the social
sciences - to make any but the most uncertain predictions of
the effects of aid. But we must not get too sophisticated about
this. Some governments (Bolivia, Greece and South Vietnam to
nntíon a few current xamples) seem so obviously determined
to prevent development that financial aid to them seems counter-
productive, whatever its terms, whatever the techniques conveyed
whatever the sectors involved (with the possible exception of
primary education), because the announcement and other short-
term effects will out-weigh any benefits to a future regime.
In most other cases, whatever one thinks about the government,
some types of aid at least, are on balance beneficial. In a
period when aid is scarce, it is of course better to concentrate
on giving aid in situations where a big announcement effect
and a heavy short-term impact will consolidate and reinforce
existing egalitarian policies - i.e. where governments are
good'.
4. The Effects of Technical Assistance
In technical assistance, the announcement effect and the
immediate economic impact are both usually limited. When, say,
a hydrologist or veterinary surgeon is sent abroad, the effect
is probably significant only in the longer term.
It is more difficult to judge the effects when assistance
is provided to the heart of the administration - to help a
planning office, say. In such cases, the long-term economic
effects may not, as a rash platitude, be as great as they
seam to be. On the other hand the announcement effect may well
be very important. Broadly speaking the nearer technical
assistance is to the centre of power, the more carefully one
should look at the announcement effect, for it might easily
provide a regime which is passively, or even actively,
obstructing development, with a 'liberal' veneer (e.g. by
en*bling a sophisticated 'plan' to be produced or a report
which at least accepts the assumptions of government policy).
1 This is the effect of some aid from COMECON countries, which
often takes the form of the delivery of complete, highly automatic,
factories.
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Moreover, administrative improvements may make a 'bad'
government more efficient in carrying out policies and
prolong its life.1
Whatever the policies of the recipient government the
very presence of a sizeable body of experts has considerable
effects. Experts enjoy foreign levels of salaries, and this
may have a signigicant long-term effect on the salaries, and
even patterns of consumption, of the local officials with
whom they work. This has political implications (encouraging
'elitism') but also economic ones: for wages policy and
import controls become more difficult to operate.
More profoundly, policy and institutions will be
influenced by what are inevitably foreign values and
attitudes, and by techniques and theories not necessarily
appropriate in the local context, though this largely
depends on the experts concerned.
This is also true of teachers. A teacher imparts not
merely a technique, but also (and this is almost certainly
more important in the long run) a set of values, reflected
in his priorities (especially his attitudes to examinations),
his relations with his pupils, his social life, and so on.
In principle, he could do a great deal to instill standards of
objectivity and to awaken his pupils to the realities of the
world, including the needs of development. Unfortunately, few
are equipped to do this (though an increasing number are
aware of the need to attempt it). To make the adaptation is
not at all easy. The line of least resistance for most is to
1 The expert himself has also some responsibility. He is
there at the request of the government. If he finds this
unpalatable - perhaps because of a political shift - should
he resign? There is no easy answer here. The guiding principle
should be, in my view, that, what ever the formalities, the
responsibility of the expert is to the people of the country,
not to whoever happens to be the government, or even to the
national state. But, as we have seen, it is a great respons-
ibility and a highly complex task to decide what are the
best interests of the people, including those yet unborn.
An expert could only decide that a government is 'bad' if
he was convinced that its fall would lead to an improvement
in development prospects - and a stranger to the country
would rarely come to such a definite conclusion, unless he
were politically bigoted. Still, perhaps the ethics of
technical assistance need more airing than they have had
so far.
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repeat uncritically what they have learned at home (e.g.
history and geography through European eyes; mechanical crafts
unadapted to local materials and needs).
University teachers on technical assistance can have a more
immediate impact. It is true that a regime which obstructs
development may well try to control the universities so tightly
that it is very difficult for anyone, even (or especially?) a
foreigner to teach or research on controversial, and therefore
important, issues. But such control is broadly hardly feasibly
except perhaps in semi-industrialised countries such as Argentina
and Brazil; in a country of tropical Africa or Asia, the
government, however repressive, is unlikely to have worked out
its ideology in such detail as to know which theories are
'dangerous' Although the education given students lasts (with
some obsolescence) a lifetime, it can also have important short-
run effects: many students will rise in a few years to senior
administrative posts. Exactly how their studies affect their
approach to development depends of course very much on the
teachers and on whether the curriculum in th discipline
concerned has been adapted to local reality
Similar points apply to training overseas, in the industrial
countries. Because of the present ferment in their universities
anyone coming from a country with a 'bad' regime is likely to
return home with more motivation to change policies and
institutions. This can be helpful to development, though not if
it means, for example, a crude attempt to supply neo-classicism,
Marxism, or other conventional models uncritically to local
circumstances. Returning students may also be less effective as
agents of change if they have absorbed too readily the values
and attitudes current in developed countries. In any case, the
effect on development depends of course also on their age - the
younger they are, the more likely that they will return as
critics and also the more of their life work will be under later
governments. It would rarely, if ever, be justifiable to reject
a young man or woman for an educational course simply because of
the nature of their government.
This analysis suggests the general proposition that some
ßovernments should (on the value premisses outlined) receive
1 I have written elsewhere on the ways in which the syllabus
of one social science needs adapting for this purpose - see
"The Debate on the Teaching of Economics in Africa" in the
Report on the Conference on the Teaching of Economics in
African Universities, Dar-es-Salaam, mimeo, Dar, 1970 (also
available in the IDS Communications Series, No. 60).
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tochnical but not financial assistance. Technical aid (in the
strict sense of 'technical') and training are likely to be on
the whole beneficial, provided that the experts and teachers
are not inappropriate.
5. The Possibilities of Influencing Aid Allocation
People who work in the development field but not for official
agencies can and should assess aid programmes critically in terms
of their effect on development. Would, however, an aid agency
official who is really interested in dvelopment have any oppor-
tunity to apply this sort of analysis?
While the composition of a bilateral programe is shaped by
foreign and commercial policies, these are usually both ambiguous
and confused. Moreover, as I have shown, although the motives for
aid may have little to do with development, its effects can still
be developmental. So an official, even quite a junior one, can to
a degree influence the content of an aid programme - it is not
hard to find some advantages to the donor ja what would be, on
the above anaiTs, appropriate forms of aid to almost any
government
The pressures on an official in a multilateral agency are,
superficially at least, weaker than on bilateral officials. No
international official, however, can ignore th. political facts
of life, especially the influence of leading powers on the poli-
cies of his organisation. Moreover, these agencies do not enjoy
much geographical flexibility. They have to start from the
astonishing premise that all member governments are good; those
which request aid have to be accommodated in some degree, sooner
or later.
If an official cares to be perversely Machiavellian he might
try to undermine governments which are patently obstructing
development by financing the capital-intensive projects which are
precisely those put forward by such regimes. A herd of white
elephants would, however, be an unfair legacy to future govern-
ments.
So one is left with the conclusion that in many cases the
only thing an official can do when dealing with 'bad' governments
1 leave out of account here ways in which agency officials
can influence attitudes to development (by the research they do
or sponsor) or the composition of technical assistance - by
selection and training of experts, and by affecting the content
of university courses in donor countries. The implications of
my analysis are fairly obvious.
will be to steer aid into forms which have a long-trm effect
and do not yield much short-term political benefit.
1 He can also speed up or delay the processing of aid requests!
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